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Joint Dominance and Tacit Collusion: An Analysis of the Irish Vodafone/O2 
Case and the Implications for Competition and Regulatory Policy. 
 
 
Abstract: The paper takes as its starting point the Irish telecom regulator ComReg’s 
finding of joint dominance by two firms in the mobile phone market in Ireland. The 
paper argues that the regulator’s decision was inconsistent with the facts in the case. 
However, it argues that the case raises wider questions about the whole concept of 
joint dominance as it has evolved under EU competition law which in our view is 
confused. We regard the approach of the ECJ in trying to use a single approach to 
joint dominance in merger analysis and in competition analysis as unjustified, 
misguided and at odds with economic analysis.  
  3
1: Introduction. 
The starting point of the present paper is the decision of the Irish communications 
regulator – ComReg- that Vodafone and O2 enjoyed significant market power (SMP) in 
the market for mobile access and call origination within the Republic of Ireland, i.e. that 
they were jointly dominant. The paper argues that ComReg’s decision was not supported 
by the evidence in the case.
1 More importantly the paper suggests that the case raises 
wider issues about the concept of joint (collective) dominance as it has evolved in EU 
competition law and its applicability in competition and regulatory cases. 
 
The concept of joint dominance has emerged through various EC Commission decisions 
and European Court judgments under Article 82 and the EC Merger Regulation. Such 
decisions and judgments reflect primarily a matter of findings as to market structures and 
developments in those market structures. Whish (2003, p.581) describes the application 
or non-application of Article 82 and the Merger Regulation to “so-called” collective 
dominance as “[O]ne of the most complex and controversial issues in Community 
competition law…”  
 
The concept of joint dominance has been extended to the regulation of the 
telecommunications sector throughout the EU. Under the legislative framework for the 
sector introduced in July 2003, national regulatory authorities can only intervene in 
telecommunications markets were one or more operators are found to possess SMP where 
SMP is defined as corresponding to the competition law concept of dominance.  
 
The balance of the paper is structured as follows. The Vodafone/O2 case is described in 
the following section. Section 3 then describes what is meant by the concept of joint 
dominance, how it emerged in EU competition law and the way in which regulators and 
courts have defined what is or is not joint dominance. The problems involved in this 
process are also described. Section 4 reviews the economic literature on joint 
dominance... In Section 5 we consider the extent to which there is a need for the concept 
                                                 
1 The authors were advisers to Vodafone (Ireland) in the appeal. ComReg agreed that the decision should 
be annulled following an appeal.  
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of Joint Dominance (as opposed to collusion) in competition and merger analysis and 
regulation. The final section briefly states our conclusions. 
 
2: Summary of the Vodafone/02 Case. 
In July 2003 a new legislative framework for telecommunications services throughout the 
EU came into force. The key feature of the new regime was that it involved a shift away 
from ex ante regulation of telecommunications towards a more competition law based 
approach. Under the new regime ex ante regulatory controls can only be imposed on 
firms that are deemed to have SMP. The concept of SMP is defined as equivalent to the 
concept of dominance under EU competition law. The rules also provide that standard 
competition law approaches to defining markets are to be used to identify relevant 
markets in telecommunications. 
 
ComReg subsequently found in 2004 that the two largest mobile network operators in the 
Republic of Ireland, Vodafone and 02, enjoyed SMP, i.e. they were jointly dominant. 
ComReg published its preliminary findings in a consultation document published in 
January 2004 and sought submissions from interested parties. (ComReg, 2004a) Prior to 
adopting a final decision ComReg consulted with both the Competition Authority and the 
EU Commission neither of which objected to its conclusions, although the Authority 
indicated that it might take a different view to ComReg with regard to retaliatory 
mechanisms. (ComReg, 2004b, Appendix A). ComReg subsequently published its 
response to submissions received in December 2004 restating most of the preliminary 
findings set out in the earlier consultation document (ComReg 2004b). The document 
identified three main issues: 
1.  Vodafone and O2 were collectively dominant;  
2.  There were strong indications of a lack of effective competition at the retail level; 
and  
3.  The joint dominant position would not be diluted in any meaningful way without 
ex ante regulatory measures. 
ComReg (2004b para 1.18) stated: 
“In practice, ComReg believes that the evidence supports the view that O2 and 
Vodafone are tacitly colluding in this market.”  
  5
Following publication of the Response to Consultation document, ComReg adopted a 
formal decision that Vodafone and O2 were jointly dominant in the market for Mobile 
Access and Call Origination. 
 
Both Vodafone and O2 along with a third mobile operator, Meteor, appealed ComReg’s 
decision to the Electronic Communications Appeal Panel (ECAP). After the first day of 
the appeal hearing, ComReg agreed that the decision should be annulled and to pay the 
costs of the appellants. ComReg’s decision appears inconsistent with the facts in several 
respects.  
 
1: ComReg argued that the market shares of Vodafone and O2 were symmetric and 
stable. At the time Vodafone’s market share was falling but was still 44% greater than 
O2’s. ComReg subsequently modified its argument somewhat stating:  
“....that, while the market shares of O2 and Vodafone are not identical, the size of O2’s 
share of the market, especially given the overall size and structure of the market, is 
sufficiently large to indicate that it has an incentive to engage in behaviour that gives rise 
to coordinated effects.” (ComReg, 2004b, Para 4.43).  
 
2: ComReg cited evidence that Vodafone and O2 both recorded a high return on 
capital employed (ROCE) to support its view that that both Vodafone and O2 enjoyed 




3: ComReg argued that Irish mobile phone charges were excessive on the basis of 
evidence that Ireland had one of the highest levels of average revenues per user (ARPU) 
in Europe. ARPU is not a measure of price: it is the product of service unit price and 
quantity of service demanded per user. ComReg (2004b) recognised that high ARPUs 
may therefore be the result of high prices, high usage (minutes of use, MOU) or a 
                                                 
2 ComReg (2004a and 2004b) cited Oxera (2003) which had pointed out the shortcomings of ROCE as a 
measure of profitability. In its ROCE calculations, ComReg excluded O2’s cash balances which had 
increased quite significantly during the course of 2003, as it did not believe that “a ROCE on cash is 
appropriate.” This reduced the measure of capital employed and thus boosted ComReg’s estimates of 
ROCE for O2.  
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combination of both. It also noted that international price basket comparisons showed 
that pre-pay mobile tariffs in Ireland were the fourth lowest in the then EU 15, although 
post-pay tariffs were above the European average.3 ComReg (2004a, para 4-59), 
nevertheless, stated that it was “unconvinced that high ARPUs in Ireland are due to high 
MOUs”. ComReg (2004b) pointed to the fact that Ireland did not have the highest MOUs 
within the EU and that other Member States had higher MOUs and lower ARPUs. 
   
4: ComReg argued that neither of the other mobile network operators, Meteor and 
3, would pose a competitive threat to Vodafone and O2 sufficient to undermine their 
joint dominance (tacit collusion) over the period of the review largely because of 
Meteor’s low market share, assumed to reflect the problems of mounting an effective 
challenge to Vodafone and O2.
4 Meteor’s failure to secure a large market share could be 
explained by the fact that its initial entry had been delayed by a protracted legal challenge 
to the award of its licence, while restrictions imposed in response to the subsequent 
outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Britain further delayed the roll-out of its network. 
However, its market share increased from 4.8% in the last quarter of 2003, to 9% by the 
final quarter of 2004. ComReg might reasonably have expected Meteor to further 
increase its market share over the review period in light of two significant developments. 
The first was the introduction of full number portability in late 2003, on foot of 
regulatory intervention by ComReg designed to reduce switching costs and increase 
customer switching.
5 The second was the conclusion of a national roaming agreement 
between Meteor and O2 in September 2004 enabling Meteor to use O2’s network 
infrastructure in areas where it did not have coverage, thereby removing another 
perceived impediment to its expansion.  
 
ComReg’s approach to the question of joint dominance in the relevant market was, 
therefore, a mixture of structural and behavioural assertions, both successfully 
challenged. 
                                                 
3 Approximately 75% of mobile phone customers are pre-pay customers. 




The main difficulty with ComReg’s finding of joint dominance, however, is not that it 
was inconsistent with the facts, but that ultimately the finding of joint dominance was 
based on ComReg’s (mistaken) belief that the market displayed various characteristics 
known to facilitate tacit collusion rather than any evidence that tacit collusion had 
occurred. This approach, however, seems consistent with established EU case law on 
joint dominance. 
  
3: EU Case Law on Joint Dominance. 
The development of EU case law on collective dominance is described by Whish (2003). 
He notes that the European Court of Justice judgment in Hoffmann La Roche
6 appeared to 
exclude the possibility that tacit collusion could be addressed under Article 82. The Court 
of First Instance decision in Italian Flat Glass
7 re-opened the issue and has been further 
clarified in a number of subsequent judgments, most notably in Compagnie Maritime 
Belge des Transports.
8  According to Rey (2002, p.3): 
“The development of the concept of collective dominance fills an important gap in 
European competition policy, since threats to competition can arise even in the absence 
of any single dominant firm. This is particularly the case when firms engage in what 
economists refer to as tacit collusion, since their behaviour may then approach that of a 
single dominant firm.” 
Jenny (2001) states that a cooperative oligopolistic equilibrium occurs where the 
oligopolists are linked by a tacit agreement not to compete. That might be considered to 
be a tautology. However, in considering the development of EU case law on joint 
dominance he points out that the jurisprudence suggests that some link (although not 
necessarily structural) between oligopolists seemed to be a pre-requisite for a finding of 
collective dominance, at least in the early joint dominance cases such as Italian Flat 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 By the time of Meteor’s entry, the level of mobile phone penetration in Ireland was relatively high so that 
in order to gain market share it had to recruit customers from the existing operators. High switching costs 
due to the lack of number portability thus represented a significant barrier to expansion for Meteor. 
6 Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission [1979] ECR 461 
7 Societa Italiana Vetro SpA and Others v. Commission (re Italian Flat Glass) (T-68/89, etc.) [1992] ECR 
II 1403. 
8 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports v. Commission Case C396/96 [2000] ECRI-1365, [2000] r CMLR 
1076.  
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Glass  and  Almelo.
9  In those cases the Court of First Instance and Court of Justice 
respectively emphasised the importance of the existence of an economic link between the 
oligopolists as a characteristic of a collective dominant position. In Gencor  the 
Commission stated that joint dominance can occur where competition is restricted among 
the oligopolists themselves or between the oligopolists as a group and other firms in the 
industry even though “active” collusion may not exist.
10 (Jenny, 2001).  “Active” here, 
presumably, means overt collusion. 
 
Compte et. al (2000) claim that the Commission had been seeking to expand the scope of 
the merger regulation and used Nestle/Perrier  as a test case to put forth a new 
interpretation of the regulation as not only prohibiting mergers which created or 
strengthened a dominant position but also as prohibiting mergers which create or 
strengthen an “oligopolistic dominance”. Whish (2003) points out that, unlike Article 82, 
the Merger Regulation contained no explicit reference to a dominant position enjoyed by 
“one or more undertakings”. 
 
Compte et.al. (op. cit) point out that the outcome approved by the Commission in 
Nestle/Perrier, involving the divestiture of the Volvic brand to BSN, increased the 
likelihood of collusion. They suggest that the Commission’s failure to prohibit the 
transaction outright may have been prompted by concerns that its attempt to expand the 
scope of the merger regulation to the case of joint dominance might have been 
overruled.
11 Motta (2004, p.283) argues that the merger should have been prohibited 
arguing that industry characteristics “strongly suggest that the firms have been able to 
tacitly collude over time.” 
 
In its Airtours decision the Commission seemed to broaden the definition of collective 
dominance to include a non-cooperative oligopolistic equilibrium. In its decision it stated 
                                                 
9 Almelo v. NV Energiebedriif Ijsselmij (C-393/92) [1994] ECR I-1477 
10 Gencor/Lonhro Case no IV/M.619 (1987). 
11 The European Court of Justice rejected arguments that the Merger Regulation only applied to cases of 
single firm dominance in the Kali und Salz cases. France v. Commission, Cases C-68/94 and C30/95 [1998] 
ECR I-1365, [1998] 4 CMLR 829.  
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that it: 
“...does not consider that it is necessary to show that the market participants as a result 
of the proposed merger would behave as if there were a cartel, with a tacit rather than 
explicit cartel agreement. In particular, it is not necessary to show that there would be a 
strict punishment mechanism. What matters for collective dominance in the present case 
is whether the degree of interdependence between oligopolists is such that it is rational 
for the oligopolist to restrict output, and in this sense reduce competition in such a way 
that a collective dominant position is created.”
12 
 
That implies that something less than joint profit maximization (the presumed goal of a 
cartel) will be treated as an incidence of joint dominance in so far as joint dominance is 
treated as “non-cooperative collusion”. Indeed, the absence of what is normally seen as a 
necessary condition for a successful strategy of increasing profits above a “competitive” 
level (a “strict punishment mechanism”) implies a much wider application of joint 
dominance as a concept. This view was rejected on appeal by the Court of First Instance 
which set out three necessary conditions to establish joint dominance: 
   The market must be sufficiently transparent for each member of the oligopoly 
to monitor the behaviour of other members; 
   There must be a clear incentive for individual members of the oligopoly not 
to cheat by departing from any common policy on the market. Therefore, there 
should be adequate deterrents to ensure long-term compliance; 
   It must be established that the reactions of any actual or future competitors, 
customers or consumers will not be able to jeopardize the results expected 
from the common policy.
13 
 
According to Motta (2004), the CFI judgment was welcome in two respects. First he 
argues that had the Commission decision been upheld it might have prohibited other 
mergers where joint dominance was far from unambiguous. Second because this 
judgment, along with two others where its decision was overturned, forced the 
                                                 
12 Airtours/First Choice OJ L93/1 (2000) at para 150. 
13 Airtours plc v. Commission, case T-342/99, judgment of 6 June 2002.  
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Commission to fully reconsider its merger policy, in particular with respect to unilateral 
effects.  
 
The European Court of Justice addressed the issue of joint dominance at some length in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge des Transports. The Court indicated that the test of collective 
dominance was the same under both Article 82 and the Merger Regulation. As will be 
seen later, we argue that this is a difficult position to support. It ruled that the existence of 
an agreement or of other links in law is not indispensable to establish joint dominance 
and that such a finding  
“... may be based on other connecting factors and would depend on an economic 




The Commission subsequently applied the concept of joint dominance in the telecoms 
sector. In its Notice on Access Agreements, the Commission stated that a necessary, 
although not sufficient condition for joint dominance was the lack of effective 
competition between undertakings. It argued that a lack of effective competition could be 
the result of links between undertakings in the form of cooperation or interconnection 
agreements but then continued: 
“The Commission does not, however, consider that either economic theory or Community 
law implies that such links are legally necessary for a joint dominant position to exist. It 
is a sufficient economic link if there is some kind of interdependence which often comes 
about in oligopolistic situations. There does not seem to be any reason in law or in 
economic theory to require any other economic link between jointly dominant 
companies.” (Para 79)  
  
Annex II of the Framework Directive states: 
“Two or more undertakings can be found to be in a joint dominant position within the 
meaning of Article 14 if, even in the absence of structural or other links between them, 
                                                 
14 Para 45.  
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they operate in a market the structure of which is considered to be conducive to 
coordinated effects.”
15 
The Commission elaborated its approach in its Guidelines on Market Analysis and SMP 
which state: 
“It follows from the Gencor and Compagnie Maritime Belge judgments that, although the 
existence of structural links can be relied upon to support a finding of a collective 
dominant position, such a finding can also be made in relation to an oligopolistic or 
highly concentrated market whose structure alone in particular, is conducive to 
coordinated effects on the relevant market.”
16 
The Guidelines list a number of market characteristics that are conducive to coordinated 
effects including the existence of retaliatory mechanisms but go on to state:  
“Depending on the circumstances of the case, the fact that one or another of the 
structural elements usually associated with collective dominance may not be clearly 
established is not in itself decisive to exclude the likelihood of a coordinated outcome.”
17 
 
In effect, therefore, it appears from the foregoing that it should not be necessary to prove 
the existence of a retaliatory or punishment mechanism in order to establish joint 
dominance. 
 
More recently, however, the Commission (DG Competition, 2005) has set out its thinking 
on Joint Dominance in its Discussion Paper on Article 82 which sought to establish a 
more economics based approach to its implementation.
18 This suggests a shift in 
approach. It states: 
“It is not sufficient for each undertaking to be aware that independent market conduct is 
profitable for all of them, because each undertaking will be tempted to increase its share 
of the market by deviating from the common strategy”. (p.17) 
                                                 
15 Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services, 7 March 2002 (Framework Directive). 
16 Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ C165 (2003) 
at para 94. 
17 Para 98. 
18 For an outline of the case in favour of a more economics based approach see Vickers (2005).  
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Accordingly it restates the tests set out by the Court of First Instance in Airtours: 
1.  The market must be sufficiently transparent for all parties to know sufficiently 
precisely and quickly of each other’s actions. 
2.  There must be a sufficient deterrent mechanism. 
3.  Coordinated action must not be capable of being undermined by others whether 
existing market operators or new entrants. 
 
4: Joint Dominance in Economics. 
The concept of joint dominance has been the subject of some debate in the literature. 
Phlips (1995) argues that a fundamental difference between EU and US competition law 
is that a collusive outcome that is achieved by non-cooperative behaviour does not legally 
constitute collusion in the US. He argues that the traditional approach adopted by the EU 
Commission and EU Courts in Article 81 cases exclude any reference to non-cooperative 
equilibrium. Rather he argues the approach taken under EU law implicitly assumes that 
the only conceivable oligopolistic outcome is a collusive one. Competition is therefore 
only possible as a result of cheating and this must be encouraged which is best done by 
creating or maintaining imperfect information among competitors. He points out that 
game theory implies that non-collusive equilibria are possible so that there is competition 
(in the sense of an outcome that yields lower profits than collusion) although no firm 
actively fights its competitors. Thus he argues that normal competition should be 
defined as, and have the properties of, a Nash equilibrium. On that basis he concludes 
that explicit collusion aims at putting participants at the joint profit maximising point on 
the profit frontier. Tacit collusion sustains profits above the level implied in the simple 
(one shot) non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium and includes the possibility of joint 
profit maximisation. Thus from an economic viewpoint explicit and tacit collusion are 
quantitatively rather than qualitatively different in terms of their implications.  
  
Joint dominance is usually interpreted as meaning tacit collusion or coordinated effects. 
Tacit collusion in the game theoretic sense means an outcome that is preferred by the 
players to the Nash equilibrium in a one-shot game. (Slade, 2004). Jenny (2001) defines 
the non-cooperative outcome as typically being an intermediate between the monopolistic  
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and the competitive outcome. He points out that all non-cooperative oligopolistic 
equilibria constitute departures from the competitive equilibrium but cautions that  
“... from a standpoint of economic analysis it is difficult to consider that some non-
cooperative equilibria are anti-competitive while others are not.” (p.367)  
 
Phlips (1995) and others have pointed out, however, that, if the discount rate is 
sufficiently high, the outcome of non-cooperative behaviour in an oligopolistic market 
may be the same as the coordinated outcome. See also Shy (1995). On the other hand, 
Jenny (2001) argues that the legal definition of single firm dominance and the need for 
consistent definitions of single and joint dominance imply that it is questionable whether 
a non-cooperative equilibrium can be characterised as a collective dominant position 
since in a non-cooperative equilibrium the pricing of each oligopolist is constrained by 
the pricing of the other oligopolists. Jenny (2001, p.368) points out that: 
“We know that a retaliation mechanism is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for 
an oligopolistic cooperative equilibrium. Thus if it is not necessary to establish the 
existence of a retaliation mechanism to demonstrate the existence of a collective 
dominant position, it means, as the Commission states, that situations where there is no 
tacit agreement (where the cooperative equilibrium is not reached) can be characterized 
as a collective dominant position.” 
 
Rey (2002) suggests that the existence of multiple means of retaliation and collusion 
creates a potential for collusion in many industries. He goes on to observe, however, that 
even in situations where collusion is sustainable, firms may end up competing if they 
expect rivals to do so. Thus the fact that collusion may be sustainable does not mean that 
it will actually occur. This obviously raises the question of the appropriate regulatory 
response.   
 
Cable et. al. (1994) argue that as non-cooperative adaptive behaviour can take the form of 
mutual market share maximisation it is questionable whether such behaviour should be 
treated differently under competition law to explicit collusion. They go on to state that 
evidence of market share interaction should invariably lead to a negative finding, whether  
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or not implicit agreement can be inferred. In fact this would appear to be precisely the 
position adopted in the UK Competition Commission (2002 para 2.141) report on SME 
banking services which concluded: 
“In such a concentrated structure, it is to be expected that there will be a recognition, 
however independently, on the part of the companies concerned that price competition is 
likely to be damaging to them. A price cut that generates little or no increased sales 
would not be profitable. One that does increase sales, at competitors’ expense, is likely 
on that account to trigger price cuts by competitors, such that all would end up less 
profitable than they previously were. In such circumstances there would be a strong 
disincentive to price cutting. In consequence price competition will be weakened, and 
largely limited to any segment of the market where such considerations do not apply.” 
 
The Competition Commission recommended the introduction of a form of price 
controls
19 in SME banking as a transitional measure  
“... to give the level of prices a decisive and significant shift toward what we considered 
to be competitive levels”. (Para 1.13).  
 
These were subsequently removed in December 2007 on the grounds that an adequate 
level of competition had emerged in the market. 
  
The difficulties with such an approach are summarised by Rey (2002, p.24) 
“In the absence of any hard evidence of explicit agreements, it is difficult if not 
impossible to directly fight collusion per se. There might actually be a debate as to 
whether antitrust authorities should take actions against purely tacit collusion, where by 
definition firms set prices non-cooperatively. In the end, the best way to determine 
whether collusion took place would be to contrast profit margins with cost and demand 
conditions. Such actions, however, would come close to regulating prices, something that 
competition authorities and courts are generally reluctant to do.” 
 
                                                 
19 A number of banks were obliged to pay interest on SME current accounts or to offer SMEs the option of 
free banking services.  
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Scheffman and Coleman (2003) point out that there is relatively little in the literature on 
how to analyse the potential for mergers to create, enhance or preserve effective 
coordinated action. Thus actual evidence of coordinated behaviour is far more 
informative of the presence or potential for coordinated behaviour as a result of a merger 
than any check-list of factors that facilitate coordination. Shapiro (1995, p.5) also states 
that  
“... there is no single accepted method of quantifying the increased likelihood of collusion 
attendant to a merger.”   
 
In similar vein Jenny (2001, p.365) observes “there is no structural set of circumstances 
that will constitute a sufficient condition for expecting parallel pricing by the 
oligopolists.” Game theoretic models’ predictions of how changes in market structure 
affect incentives to collude are very fragile. (Slade, 2004). 
 
5: Implications 
(i) : What is meant by joint dominance?  
The concept of joint dominance has never been formally, operationally and conclusively 
defined for competition policy implementation, even at the level of the definition of 
dominance as offered in United Brands.
20 As a consequence there is considerable 
confusion as to what constitutes joint dominance and when it can be held to exist. One 
could argue that it is really a statement about a structure of a market that is such as to 
facilitate to the point of making probable or even possible a level of tacit collusion 
between the small number of large players that form the supply side of the market, or the 
bulk of the supply side. From this perspective, actual behaviour or even evaluation of 
                                                 
20  Which is inadequate, to say the least: “For example, a popular definition in the legal literature 
describes dominance as “the ability of firms to act independently of the market”. This is neither a 
meaningful definition nor one that is operational for practical policy. The definition is not meaningful since 
no firm can ever act “independently” of the market…..From the economic perspective dominance is 
nothing else but a significant degree of market power. More precisely, it is a position of the firm in the 
market, in which the price can be raised significantly above marginal costs towards the price the firm 
would set were it a monopolist offering all products in the market.” (Kühn, 2001, p.4). However, the same 
author does not add much to the debate by stating later: “…we have to define joint dominance as the ability 
of firms to jointly exercise market power ….This is nothing else but asking the question to what extent 
collusion between a given set of firms in the industry is feasible.” (op. cit., p.10)  
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possible behaviour by players is of secondary (if any) importance in reaching a 
determination that joint dominance exists, or may exist. From a merger control 
perspective that makes perfect sense, since merger control is aimed at regulating market 
structures on a forward looking basis. Clearly restrictions on mergers or acquisitions that 
result in a significant reduction in competition encompass a situation in which the 
opportunity for collusion, tacit or explicit, is enhanced. There is a likelihood of a 
significant reduction in competition, and this suffices to support a negative finding in 
relation to a merger. Structural consequences and probable behavioural consequences of 
the acquisition determine the appropriate regulatory response.
21 The joint dominance test 
from a mergers regulation perspective is essentially a structural matter. 
 
(ii) : Defining and testing for joint dominance: horses for courses 
However, if the matter is considered from the perspective of enforcement of Articles 81 
(ex-85) and 82 (ex-86) structure-based definitions may be irrelevant other than as an 
exclusionary device (it can’t be an agreement or an abuse because the structure observed 
is inconsistent with such behaviour as rational outcomes of firm level decision-making). 
By definition collusive behaviour or abusive behaviour cannot be observed if the 
structure rules it out. That, unfortunately, leaves unanswered the question as to what 
constitutes behavioural joint dominance when the observed structure makes it possible, 
unless we state that if the structure makes collusion possible that constitutes joint 
dominance, so that we are back to defining joint dominance in terms of objective 
characteristics of market structure. Articles 81 and 82 regulation concerns behaviour, and 
this in turn requires deciding what behaviour is offensive as constituting abuse of a 
position of joint dominance or as evidence that undertakings are acting jointly in a 
position of joint dominance. 
 
This requires that we define joint dominance in behavioural terms, while accepting 
                                                 
20 “In the context of merger control, the primary task is not to distinguish between individual rivalry and 
tacit collusion when they occur but, rather, to assess the competitive impact of a proposed merger, and 
therefore the likelihood that they will occur in the future.” Ivaldi et al, (2003b), p.5. At the same time, it 
should be noted that recent work on the competition implications of structural consequences of an  
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certain structural features of a market as a necessary pre-condition. That in turn requires 
that we reach a testable means of characterising joint dominance in behavioural terms 
where structure implies the plausibility of assuming interdependence in decision-making. 
Does joint dominance exist once interdependence exists? Or does the concept apply only 
to a sub-category of such situations. It is clear that the literature is unclear on that issue. 
The jurisprudence is no better. Whatever the response to these points, this indicates the 
basis on which we observed that there is a problem with the ECJ view that the joint 
dominance test is the same whether mergers or other actions by undertakings are being 
considered (see our comment on the ECJ decision on Compagnie Maritime above). 
 
Then there is the question of findings of joint dominance in a regulatory environment. In 
the Vodafone O2 case, the Irish regulator argued initially from market shares and 
structure, and added to that a finding that pricing behaviour was consistent with joint 
dominance in that the price structure supported an unusually high level of profitability. 
The market was extremely concentrated, prices were higher than elsewhere and 
profitability as measured by the return on capital employed was exceptionally high. On 
that basis there existed significant market power on the part of the two largest players and 
that constituted joint dominance, which in turn warranted ex ante regulation. Thus, the 
Irish regulator was not (superficially) making a finding as to joint dominance based 
simply on the structural aspects of the market (entry conditions, transparency, market 
shares and so on). Instead, it sought to base the finding on indicia of behaviour in a 
context where, it alleged, structural conditions made joint dominance possible. As it 
happened, ComReg’s findings on structural and behavioral aspects of the market were 
strongly challenged as a consequence of which the finding was withdrawn before the 
appeals panel could decide on the matter. 
 
(iii) : Defining and testing: lessons from the ComReg case 
Arising from the Irish experience in the Vodafone O2 case, it is our view that it is timely 
and necessary to suggest that the question of joint dominance for the purposes of Article 
                                                                                                                                                 
acquisition in a concentrated markets (e.g., on share symmetry) have made it more difficult to make a priori 
decisions on those implications and consequently on the acquisitions. See Ivaldi et al (2003a)  
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81 and 82, and regulatory intervention be formally defined in terms of economic theory 
and objectively testable criteria. We believe that such a methodology is in fact available. 
Our starting point is to consider the matter from the point of view of competition among 
the few, and to suggest that a terminological confusion needs to be cleared up. 
 
At the beginning of Section 2 above we noted that in Hoffman Laroche , the ECJ appears 
to have found that tacit collusion could not be dealt with under Article 86 (now 82). In 
the absence of a concept of joint dominance that makes perfect sense, since neither player 
in tacit collusion has single firm dominance. Tacit collusion, if an offence, has to be dealt 
with under Article 85 (now 81) as an agreement between undertakings. The comment of 
Rey (2003, p3, cited subsequently) indicates that the concept of joint dominance is an 
important development because  
“…when firms engage in what economists refer to as tacit collusion,…their behaviour 
may …approach that of a single dominant firm.” 
 
If, of course, there is some form of agreement between them then the joint dominance 
concept is unnecessary, since such an agreement will fall under Article 81. If the 
Woodpulp
22  decision is to be regarded as indicative of competition law, parallel 
behaviour without some form of conscious agreement to support it does not qualify as an 
offence under article 81.  Hence the importance of joint dominance lies in the possibility 
that firms’ behaviour may mimic collusion without their being any agreement at all, and 
(possibly) fall within the remit of Article 81. This is described (unfortunately) in the 
economics literature as “tacit collusion” or “non-cooperative collusion”, an oxymoron if 
ever there was one. The problem lies in the use of the terms “collusive” or “cooperative” 
as descriptors of this behaviour in this context.  Instead, we believe, there should be 
explicit recognition that what is involved is the consequence of market structures for 
repeated game outcomes compared with single shot games 
 
(iv) Joint dominance, competition and regulation: the benchmark approach 
                                                 
22 [1993] 4 CMLR 407  
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If this is accepted, what is involved in the concept of joint dominance (non-cooperative 
collusion) is simply the difference between independent (non-cooperative) decision 
making in a one-shot game and similar behaviour in a repeated game. On this basis, an 
alternative interpretation of the Hoffman Laroche decision is that the outcome of 
independent decision-making by firms cannot be held to be anti-competitive, since anti-
competitive behaviour engaged in by a group of firms requires an agreement of some sort 
(collusion). From a regulatory or Articles 81 and 82 perspective joint dominance is, 
therefore, a conceptual device to include the consequences of independent decisions by 
undertakings in conditions of recognised interdependence as behaviour that is within the 
set of actions prohibited by EU competition law under some circumstances but not under 
others. 
 
A recent theoretical paper offers some support for this way of looking at joint dominance 
(Martin, 2006). It seeks, inter alia, to model collusion in a manner that distinguishes 
between collusion and “non-cooperative collusion”. This is shown to mean that a model 
that analyses collusive behaviour based on express agreements yields qualitatively 
different outcomes and predictions from those given by independent decision-making 
when there is recognized interdependence in a repeated game, with both of these being 
bench-marked against the outcome in a single shot non-cooperative game with 
interdependence. This last is treated as the “competitive” outcome, since with 
independent behaviour it defines a Nash equilibrium contingent on the market structure, 
or, roughly, the closest feasible approximation to an outcome in which there is no 
interdependence effect on decision making. 
 
It is well known that in a concentrated market where interdependence is recognized, and 
where entry conditions support it, the outcome of independent decision-making may 
differ depending on whether or not it is a single shot or a repeated game. If it may be 
assumed that the outcome of the single shot game, repeated because, for example, of the 
absence of transparency or the possibility of entry, constitutes the competitive baseline, 
the time path for output or prices under circumstances that enhance interdependence and 
lead to “tacit collusion” will involve values for these that are closer to the joint profit  
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maximizing values. In the model analysed by Martin, the repeated game has players that 
adopt the “grim trigger” strategy, whereby they will revert from any given output lower 
than the one shot game output to the one shot game output if observed price falls below 
some threshold price. This yields an expected level of output higher than the joint profit 
level, but lower than that of a repeated one shot game. Martin describes this as the non-
cooperative collusion equilibrium output. The key conclusion relevant to this paper of the 
Martin model (and subject to some structural assumptions, but reasonably general) is 
summed up by the author as follows: 
“A trigger strategy allows firms to restrict output.... and to increase value compared with 
repeated play of the one-shot game Nash-Cournot equilibrium. It does not allow firms to 
restrict output to the joint profit-maximizing level; to make defection unattractive, firms 
expand total output above that level that would be offered by a monopoly supplier...” 
(p.1307) 
 
Thus, the “non-cooperative collusion” equilibrium in this model excludes the values 
associated with explicit collusion. 
 
Assuming that a regulator or competition authority has access to adequate data on costs 
and demand, it is possible to compute plausible values for the base-line competitive 
output, and, as result, to evaluate the hypothesis that the observed values for output or 
price reflect “non-cooperative collusion”, or that there is joint dominance (see, for 
example, Slade (2004) or Dodgson et al. (1993) for good examples of this approach to 
empirical testing of firm behaviour in concentrated markets).  
 
Following, then, Ivaldi et al (2003a) we identify joint dominance with firm behaviour that 
is described as “tacit collusion”, where the latter reflects individual firm choices of 
actions that are covered by the following description as a necessary condition:  
“Tacit collusion….. requires that a firm make a choice which would not be in its interest 
if it assumed that other firms would be uninfluenced by its choice” ( p.6).  
By this is meant that future actions of other firms are unaffected. It is of its nature 
forward looking. It must, therefore, involve a modification of the actions chosen by the  
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firm in the context of a one shot game, and the equilibrium value of output or price must 
be different from the Nash equilibrium value in a one shot game. For tacit collusion to be 
a dominant strategy for players it must be the case that the expected outcome from tacit 
collusion is preferred to choosing any other strategy. The one shot game value for price 
or output is the lowest value (price) or highest value (quantity) consistent with rational 
behaviour when each firm rationally must take into account the demand and cost 
parameters facing other firms and in making its decision. Tacit collusion, to be observed, 
must offer the players profits that are higher than following a strategy of  adopting the 
relevant one shot game. This implies that a finding of joint dominance as a matter of 
probability requires an ability to show that prices/outputs/profits lie between the one shot 
game value and the hypothetical monopoly value. 
 
An interesting aspect of this approach is that it suggests that a regulator faces a more 
difficult task when adopting policy measures on firm behaviour than when examining 
market structure. Specifically, the implications of the concept of joint dominance for a 
utility regulator (such as Ireland’s ComReg) are more demanding than those facing a 
merger/acquisition regulator or a competition authority seeking to enforce the provisions 
of Articles 81 or 82. Put another way, joint dominance operationally has a different 
meaning for merger regulation from the meaning to be applied in the case of regulation or 




The literature and the EU jurisprudence on the subject of joint dominance are confused 
and confusing to the reader. We note, but do not address, the issue raised by Phlips 
(1995) as to whether (as in the EU) behaviour that falls into the category of non-
cooperative collusion should be regarded as potentially illegal, as opposed to the US 
where it is treated as the imperfect outcome in an imperfect market. We regard the 
approach of the ECJ in trying to use a single approach to joint dominance in merger 
analysis and in competition analysis as unjustified, misguided and at odds with economic 
analysis. In the case of regulatory supervision, a finding of joint dominance, a trigger for  
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ex ante regulation, requires analysis of market performance rather than simple reliance on 
structure in the broadest sense. For this purpose we suggest that the approach required is 
to benchmark actual market performance against a hypothetical one-shot game 
equilibrium. Contrary to what is sometimes said, recent developments in industrial 
organisation analysis offer regulators a methodology for undertaking such exercises, and 
it is reasonable to assume that a competent regulator can obtain the necessary data sets 
for such exercises. The collapse of the case brought by Ireland’s ComReg illustrates the 
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